In order to limit orbital debris, unmanned spacecraft design needs to comply with ISO 24113 'Space systems -Space debris mitigation requirements' or any standards equivalent to it. In addition to that, to limit orbital debris generated by collisions, unmanned spacecrafts should be protected against small debris impact which may cause failures of critical components for post mission disposal. This paper proposes a spacecraft design procedure based on the quantitative estimation of the small debris impact.
Introduction
The total number of cataloged debris on orbit has doubled in the last 15 years. The probability of collision with orbital debris (hereafter orbital debris is abbreviated to OD) has become too high to ignore in designing unmanned spacecrafts (hereafter S/C). The intentional break-up of FENGYUN 1C in 2007, and collision between IRIDIUM 33 and COSMOS 2251 in 2009 generated an enormous number of OD. To prevent accidental break-ups including those collisions, it is necessary to succeed in post mission disposal, that is, to remove S/Cs after the end of mission from Earth orbit or from the protected orbit regions specified in ISO 24113. 1) For the successful disposal, it is necessary to protect critical components for post mission disposal against OD impact.
However, the effects of OD impact on unmanned S/C were not verified by engineering evidence.
The working group was formed by members from JAXA, universities, and S/C manufactures in order to investigate the effects of OD impact on critical parts and bumpers by hypervelocity impact (hereafter HVI) tests and numerical simulations.
The acquired knowledge is reflected now to the unmanned S/C design. This paper describes the design procedure of the S/C applying quantitative data from HVI test and simulation results taking into account the OD risks.
Modified OD Model
MASTER2005 and ORDEM2000 are the available flux models in JAPAN. MASTER2005 is usually used to assess risk of OD impacts on JAXA's unmanned S/C. MASTER2005 is more convenient than ORDEM2000 because the flux on each oriented surface can be analyzed and meteoroid models are implemented in it. On the other hand, ORDEM2000 can Fig.1 . The debris flux in 2018 is the worst case between 2013 and 2024.
As a result, the modified flux of φ 700 μm in 2018 is about 100 times as large as the one in 2004 analyzed using MASTER2005. In this way the modified flux after 2009 can be much larger than flux in 2004 analyzed using MASTER2005 depending on OD diameter and orbit.
However, the flux model should be duly selected to take a conservative approach for a given situation in terms of OD impact risk for the safety of S/C.
Effects of OD Impact
Impacts of OD smaller than φ 1 cm have been considered to cause non-catastrophic failure. The flux of OD larger than φ 1 cm is as low as about 0.0001 /m 2 /year on low earth orbit (hereafter LEO) based on MASTER2005 as shown in Table 1 . Consequently, the mission failure caused by OD impact was not considered. That was one of the reasons why protection against OD was not applied to unmanned S/Cs.
However, the HVI tests and numerical simulations on electrical power cables showed that even OD smaller than φ 1 cm may cause loss of functionality of unmanned S/Cs.
4) The impact of alumina larger than φ 0.03 cm on bundled electrical power cables may cause sustained arcing and electrical short.
The electrical short of bus power line can lead to total loss of functionality. The flux of OD larger than φ 0.03 cm is as high as about 15 /m 2 /year on LEO based on modified flux as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 explains the possibility of critical impact is predicted to be so high compared to the figures in Table 1 that the unmanned S/Cs on LEO should be protected against OD.
On the other hand, the HVI test results on solar panels showed that the impact on solar cell is not critical. Trigger discharges occurred between the solar cell and the substrate at some test, but no sustained discharge nor short-circuit between the solar cells and the substrate was detected. 
Protection Design

Layout design
The flux density of OD depends on the orientation of the surface relative to the velocity vector of S/C. In order to study it, each surface of S/C is defined as shown in Fig.2 . 'Leading' surface is facing direction of motion. 'Space' surface is facing the zenith. 'Earth' surface is facing the nadir. 'Right' / 'Left' surfaces are perpendicular to 'Leading' and to 'Earth'.
'Trailing' surface is facing opposite to the direction of motion.
The distribution of OD / meteoroids impact on LEO S/C pointing the Earth is shown in Fig.3 and Fig.4 as examples.
The impact probability on 'Leading' surface is the highest. The vulnerable components should be kept away from 'Leading'. Otherwise, they should be protected with a shield, or their redundant components should be added. 
Internal components
Electronic components and pressure vessels are laid out usually inside a honeycomb sandwich panel structure. The collision risk of components inside the structure is smaller than that of components outside the structure, because the honeycomb sandwich panel can be expected to act as a bumper.
However, some hypervelocity particles can penetrate the honeycomb sandwich panel. The diameters of OD which penetrate the honeycomb sandwich panel with respect to velocity were researched by HVI tests and numerical simulations. 7, 8) Using the model shown in Fig.5 , tests and simulations were performed with the following assumptions as a case study to investigate the damages of internal components caused by OD penetrating the honeycomb sandwich panel, and to research how to protect them. The model consisted of a 25.4mm thick honeycomb sandwich panel and a chassis made from A2024. Table 3 in the case that the probabilities of being penetrated in the mission life are lower than 1.
Though internal components are protected by honeycomb sandwich panels, ones mounted on 'Leading' and 'Right / Left' panels should have thick mounting plates as shown in Table 3 . Still, they are required just 1/2 or 1/3 as thick as the outer plates of chassis outside honeycomb sandwich panels.
Mounting with standoff of 10 mm between a honeycomb panel and an internal component in Fig.5 can save the thickness by approximately 20 %.
Angle between 'Leading' honeycomb sandwich panel and the direction of motion as shown in Fig.6 is one of the protection methods for inside components because a honeycomb core can be expected to act as a multi-bumper. For example, an experimental data shows that the penetrating depth at 30 degrees incidence is a quarter of that at 0 degrees incidence. 
OD Mitigation Design
Avoiding intentional release of OD
The S/Cs have been required to avoid the intentional release of OD and have been complied with it.
Avoiding Break-ups in Earth Orbit
ISO 24113 states as follows: 'The probability of accidental break-up of S/Cs shall be no greater than 10 -3 until its end of life' with the exception of impacts.
To meet the requirement, first of all, structural safety margin of S/Cs must be verified. The pressure vessels on S/Cs are commonly designed to safety to leak before break (LBB).
To comply with the requirement, it is recommended to analyze the probabilities of potential failure modes which can cause break-up.
Removing a spacecraft from the protected Regions after end of mission
ISO 24113 requires as below. 'A spacecraft operating in the LEO protected region with ether a permanent or periodic presence, shall limit its post-mission presence in the LEO protected region to a maxim 25 years from the end of mission. ' Most of S/Cs in above 600 km orbit shall execute disposal maneuver depending on area/mass ratio (hereafter A/M) and air resistance coefficient (hereafter Cd).
6) Therefore a spacecraft shall be designed to have propulsive capability and propellant enough to do the disposal maneuver. The higher the altitude is, the heavier the necessary propellant becomes. The mass ratios of necessary propellant to do the disposal Geostationary earth orbit (hereafter GEO) disposal maneuver shall be required as well.
The probability of successful disposal of a spacecraft is required to be at least 0.9 at the time of the disposal in ISO 24113.
The estimation accuracy of residual propellant is one of key factors for success of disposal. Currently, considerable error margin is required to fully abide by the ISO rule, which leads to S/C mass increase. So, further study is needed to estimate the residual propellant more accurately to avoid excess margin.
Avoiding the collision with a tracked debris
Avoidance maneuver of S/C shall be required if the possibility of the collision with tracked debris exceeds the threshold value. Tracked debris is larger than approximately 10 cm in LEO, than approximately 1m in GEO. The estimated propellant for the avoidance maneuver shall be considered.
For example, the threshold value of avoidance maneuver which is based on NASA Technical Standard is 0.001. 9) In that case, about 1 avoidance maneuver a year is predicted for a spacecraft with 40 m 2 based on the modified flux model as shown in Fig.1 (altitude: 630 km, inclination: 98 deg, year: 2018). This will also lead to S/C mass increase even if the necessary propellant per once is little.
Summary
The OD models were modified reflecting the worse result between MASTER2005 and ORDEM2000, and the break-ups occurred in 2007 and 2009. The probability of critical impact on S/C is found to be so high compared to conventional assessment. Thus unmanned S/Cs design to limit OD has been quantitatively assessed with evidence data acquired in HVI tests and numerical simulations.
The mitigation design leads to heavier mass of S/C for the cause of the protections against ODs, the avoiding collision maneuver, and the disposal maneuver, accordingly. So, further study is needed to improve the assessment accuracy of debris environment and spacecraft design accuracy, especially the accuracy of residual propellant estimation to reduce excessive mass margin.
